The new lunar race is about far more than planting flags on dusty terrain. It will ultimately determine who shapes the laws, infrastructure, and economy of humanity’s next frontier.
The next borders of power will not be drawn only on Earth. They are already taking shape in low Earth orbit, at the Earth-moon Lagrange points, and around the highly contested lunar south pole. These will not be borders in the traditional sense: the landmark 1967 Outer Space Treaty strictly prohibits the national appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies. Yet, practical access, physical infrastructure, technical standards, and operational practice can create strategic realities long before diplomats ever agree on new legal language.
That is why Türkiye’s accession to the Artemis Accords on Aug. 31, 2026, as the 71st signatory, carries far more weight than a merely ceremonial signature. It places Türkiye directly inside one of the defining global debates of this century: who will write the rules for sustained human and commercial activity beyond Earth?
The sheer scale of what is coming is easy to underestimate. The European Space Agency cites forecasts predicting more than 400 lunar missions between 2022 and 2032. Meanwhile, a comprehensive PwC assessment projects that markets for lunar goods and services could reach a cumulative $170 billion by 2040, including roughly $100 billion in lunar transportation alone. While these figures remain forecasts rather than guarantees, they clearly reveal the overarching direction of travel: the moon is rapidly moving from an occasional scientific destination to an emerging domain of critical infrastructure, complex logistics, science, and global commerce.
The competition is particularly intense at the lunar south pole. Permanently shadowed regions may contain vital water ice, a precious resource that could support human crews and potentially be processed into breathable oxygen and rocket propellant. Areas with favorable, consistent sunlight could support power generation for long-term bases. Furthermore, scientifically valuable terrain, safe landing corridors, and communications access are severely limited. NASA has already refined its Artemis III planning to nine candidate landing regions near the south pole, while other national programs are studying the exact same broad geography. On a celestial body with no sovereign territory, physical proximity itself is rapidly becoming politically significant.
The debate over lunar access begins with an older and still unanswered legal question: where does space itself legally begin? International law has never established a universally binding altitude at which sovereign airspace ends and outer space begins. The Karman line at 100 kilometers is widely used as a practical reference, while some national practices apply a lower threshold. This ambiguity has not stopped orbital activity, but it reveals a recurring pattern: technology creates strategic realities faster than law creates consensus. On the moon, the problem is no longer a vertical line separating air and space. Instead, it is the emergence of functional boundaries between operations competing for the exact same terrain, resources, and infrastructure.
The Artemis Accords attempt to convert broad treaty principles into concrete operational conduct. They reinforce peaceful purposes, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, registration of space objects, open scientific data, preservation of space heritage, responsible resource use, and debris mitigation. Most controversially, they provide for temporary "safety zones" to coordinate activities and avoid harmful interference between different actors.
However, safety zones must not become sovereignty by another name. Under the Outer Space Treaty, no state may claim the moon by occupation, use, or any other means. The Artemis framework itself explicitly states that such zones should be based on objective scientific and engineering criteria, remain strictly temporary, and respect free access and due regard for others. Yet, the practical questions are inherently difficult. How large may a safety zone be? How long may it remain in place? What happens when two separate missions seek access to the exact same ice-bearing crater or communications corridor? Who decides whether coordination is necessary or exclusion is excessive?
These are not abstract legal puzzles for academics. Their answers will directly influence global investment, insurance markets, mission design, and, ultimately, geopolitical power. The first actors to build navigation networks, communications relays, landing services, energy systems, and surface logistics will not own the moon. They may nevertheless shape the conditions under which others can reach and use it. Infrastructure becomes influence. Standards become strategy. Repeated practice can quickly harden into binding rules.
Türkiye’s Moon Mission and Domestic Capabilities
For Türkiye, the conclusion is clear: the Artemis Accords must not be treated as the quiet end of a diplomatic process, but rather as an essential entry point into global rule-making. Signing gives Türkiye a seat at the table, but its technological contribution will ultimately determine the weight of its voice.
Türkiye does not enter this high-stakes arena empty-handed. The National Space Program and the Lunar Research Program (AYAP) are systematically developing domestic capabilities in spacecraft design, advanced propulsion, guidance and navigation, secure communications, specialized materials, mission operations, and scientific payloads. AYAP matters profoundly because a country that reaches the moon through its own engineering capacity enters negotiations very differently from one that arrives with political statements alone.
Industry and Technology Minister Mehmet Fatih Kacır’s announcement on Sept. 16 gave this national ambition tangible form. Türkiye’s first lunar spacecraft has successfully completed assembly and integration and entered rigorous environmental testing. Built with more than 80% domestic content, it is targeted for launch in early 2027. The Artemis signature and AYAP now tell a unified story: Türkiye wants to help shape lunar cooperation while developing the capability to reach the moon through its own independent engineering.
Türkiye should now link AYAP directly to a focused, long-term lunar strategy. It should identify two or three critical fields in which it can become indispensable: precision timing and navigation, resilient communications, autonomous mobility, scientific instrumentation, advanced materials, or small-payload delivery. Its robust aerospace and defense companies should be actively prepared for emerging lunar supply chains. Its universities should be deeply connected to international payload calls and planetary research networks. Its startups should be encouraged to design for the broader cislunar economy, rather than merely focusing on today’s crowded satellite market.
The economic argument is compelling, but Türkiye’s potential role is much larger than mere market share. Positioned strategically between Europe, Asia, and the wider Global South, Türkiye can advocate for a lunar order that remains open and accessible to emerging space nations. Seventy-one Artemis signatories represent considerable diplomatic momentum, but its ultimate legitimacy will depend on whether cooperation delivers real access, shared knowledge, and new capabilities, rather than creating a permanent divide between rule-makers and rule-takers.
Türkiye can champion three essential principles. First, safety zones must remain transparent, proportional, temporary, and non-exclusive. Second, the use of lunar resources must strictly comply with international law and must not quietly evolve into territorial control. Third, scientific data, interoperability, and capacity building must ensure that the benefits of lunar activity extend far beyond the states and companies able to arrive first.
This position would effectively combine national ambition with international responsibility. Türkiye does not need to choose between strategic autonomy and international cooperation. AYAP can strengthen national capabilities while Artemis partnerships multiply their scientific and economic impact. In fact, a country contributes most effectively to international cooperation when it brings something substantive of its own to the table.
Artemis is not the only framework shaping the next phase of lunar cooperation. The China-Russia-led International Lunar Research Station represents another emerging architecture for long-term scientific activity on and around the moon. For Türkiye, the existence of parallel frameworks reinforces a broader point: strategic autonomy in space should mean the capacity to engage across different partnerships while remaining firmly anchored in international law, peaceful use, and scientific cooperation.
That national ambition now reaches a global stage. Türkiye is hosting the 77th International Astronautical Congress in Antalya from Oct. 5-9, 2026, under the guiding theme "The World Needs More Space." The motto is especially relevant to the unfolding lunar debate. The world needs not only more physical access to space, but more space for cooperation, for emerging nations to participate meaningfully in rule-making, and for competing technological ecosystems to remain in constructive dialogue. Hosting IAC 2026 allows Türkiye to demonstrate that its space ambitions extend far beyond reaching new destinations to helping convene the conversations that will determine how those destinations are explored and governed.
The moon will serve as humanity’s first major test of whether rules can successfully precede conflict. On Earth, regulation too often arrived only after borders had hardened, resources were heavily contested, and environmental damage had become irreversible. Humanity does not have to repeat that troubled sequence beyond its home planet.
In the Apollo era, national power was measured by who planted a flag first. In the Artemis era, it will increasingly be measured by who builds the systems others rely on, who convenes the partnerships others join, and who shapes the rules others follow. Türkiye has officially entered that arena. AYAP can provide technological credibility, Artemis can offer a platform for cooperation, and IAC 2026 can serve as a global stage for diplomacy and debate. The next objective must therefore be larger than simply reaching the moon: Türkiye must arrive equipped with the technology, diplomatic influence, and legal vision needed to help define what happens there next. The world needs more space, and Türkiye is stepping up to help determine what kind of space that will be.
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values, or position of Daily Sabah, which provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its commitment to open and informed public discussion.)