A prevailing view in international relations holds that the competitive rhetoric and strategic tensions between Türkiye, Israel, and Greece are primarily situational and driven by immediate political considerations. This conventional approach frequently interprets current friction in Türkiye-Israel relations through the narrow lens of the Gaza war and the broader Palestinian issue, while viewing the long-standing Türkiye-Greece rivalry through the prism of periodic bilateral disputes in the Aegean Sea, the island of Cyprus, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly, the growing strategic and military ties between Israel and Greece in recent years are often analyzed as a bilateral rapprochement operating independently of these two distinct areas of regional competition.
However, a closer examination of contemporary geopolitical trends reveals a more complex reality. Contrary to this general understanding, Türkiye’s ongoing rivalries with Israel and Greece are increasingly moving beyond cyclical political spats to undergo a profound structural transformation. More importantly, the Türkiye-Israel and Türkiye-Greece rivalries—which previously progressed along largely independent tracks—are becoming inextricably intertwined. They are rapidly evolving into central components of a much broader, interconnected strategic power struggle stretching dynamically from the waters of the Aegean across the Eastern Mediterranean and deep into the Levant.
At the heart of this geopolitical transformation lie fundamental shifts that go far beyond superficial diplomatic disputes or the harsh rhetoric occasionally employed by political leaders. The material foundations of this deepening rivalry are being reshaped by structural changes in the regional balance of power, shifts in military capabilities, continuous advancements in domestic defense industries, the establishment of new security partnerships, and the emergence of a volatile new strategic geography in the Levant following the prolonged Syrian conflict.
Consequently, foreign policy analysts and security experts increasingly find it inadequate to evaluate today’s complex security environment through the traditional framework of three separate, isolated bilateral relationships. The hardening of diplomatic and strategic ties between Türkiye and Israel, the robust strategic rapprochement forged between Israel and Greece, and the historical, unresolved rivalry between Türkiye and Greece are now actively influencing one another within the exact same regional power equation.
Developments on the ground in Syria are demonstrably altering the overarching balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simultaneously, deepening defense cooperation between Israel and Greece directly impacts Ankara’s long-term security planning, just as the rapid expansion of Türkiye’s indigenous military and defense industry capabilities plays an increasingly significant role in the strategic calculations of both Athens and Tel Aviv.
In attempting to conceptualize this multifaceted dynamic, political scientists frequently turn to classical analytical frameworks. Harvard scholar Graham Allison’s influential "Thucydides Trap" framework offers an important analytical tool for understanding the structural friction underway when an established power feels threatened by a rising power. However, the complex security dynamics currently emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant transcend the classic rising-power versus established-power dichotomy described by Allison. In this theater, there is no single rising power facing off against a single established power. Instead, Türkiye’s expanding regional capabilities increasingly intersect with the diverse, often divergent security calculations of both Israel and Greece—two nations that find themselves competing with Ankara for different reasons and across entirely different geographic regions.
For this reason, the emerging regional structure is more accurately described as a "Thucydides Triangle" rather than a traditional "Thucydides Trap." At the very center of this geopolitical triangle lies an issue that runs far deeper than political rhetoric: the shifting balance of power in the region, the mutual fear and uncertainty generated by this tectonic shift, the various balancing responses enacted by each state, and the way these calculated responses are progressively breeding a self-reinforcing cycle of counterbalancing.
In practical terms, the core issue is no longer simply what these three governments say about one another in public statements. The real, underlying driver of contemporary security policy is how each nation perceives the growing power of its neighbors, and how those subjective perceptions actively shape their respective long-term strategic behaviors.
Toward Regional Alignment
The modern historical starting point for the formation of this intricate strategic triangle can be traced back to the broader regional transformation that unfolded after 2010. The severe deterioration of diplomatic and political relations between Türkiye and Israel in the wake of the Mavi Marmara incident not only ruptured ties between the two capitals but also abruptly shifted the entire strategic geometry that had quietly governed the Eastern Mediterranean since the 1990s.
As Ankara and Tel Aviv drifted into prolonged diplomatic estrangement, Israel and Greece quickly began to identify powerful new strategic opportunities in one another. Major offshore energy discoveries, expanded military cooperation, and wider shifts in Middle Eastern politics rapidly deepened the relations between Israel and Greece, which had previously been relatively limited in scope. It would be inaccurate to argue that Greece simply replaced Türkiye in Israel’s strategic calculus, or that Israel deliberately pivoted toward a direct, anti-Turkish military alliance. Nevertheless, the underlying regional power dynamics began to shift in a remarkably consequential direction.
During this exact same historical period, Türkiye itself was undergoing a profound domestic and foreign policy transformation. Ankara steadily evolved into a more autonomous actor across the Middle East, successfully expanding its diplomatic and economic capabilities while adopting a distinctly more assertive stance regarding the regional order. The regional upheaval sparked by the Arab uprisings further accelerated this transformation. Türkiye stopped operating merely within a regional architecture largely designed by external Western powers and instead emerged as an assertive regional player actively seeking to shape that architecture in alignment with its own vital national priorities.
The second distinct phase of this ongoing strategic transformation emerged after 2016, as the Eastern Mediterranean rapidly crystallized into a primary arena for intense regional power competition.
Initially, many policymakers and international observers harbored optimistic hopes that vast offshore energy discoveries could serve as a fresh foundation for regional cooperation and economic integration. However, within a remarkably short span of time, energy exploration, contested maritime jurisdiction areas, the enduring Cyprus dispute, and broader geopolitical ambitions became inextricably intertwined. As trilateral cooperation between Greece, Israel, and the Greek Cypriot administration intensified, Ankara responded by vigorously strengthening its own regional strategy. Türkiye increased the visible operational footprint of its naval power, aggressively expanded its own energy exploration and drilling activities in disputed waters, and signed a landmark maritime delimitation agreement with Libya in 2019.
The acute geopolitical tensions witnessed across the Eastern Mediterranean in 2020 served as a stark illustration of how far this structural transformation had progressed. It was abundantly clear that the dispute was no longer merely about sharing offshore energy resources. A much broader, all-encompassing strategic competition was emerging directly at the volatile intersection of national sovereignty, disputed maritime zones, naval military power, opposing alliance systems, and competing visions of the regional order.
The first clear, unmistakable manifestations of Thucydidean security dynamics became glaringly evident during this period. While Türkiye’s rapidly expanding military and technological capabilities naturally encouraged its neighbors to seek counterbalancing relationships, those very counterbalancing alliances reinforced Ankara’s deeply held perception that its legitimate strategic maneuvering space was being systematically restricted. Consequently, routine defensive steps or military exercises that one side claimed were enacted purely for deterrence were routinely interpreted by rival capitals as definitive indicators of aggressive intentions or latent future threats.
However, the diplomatic developments that unfolded after 2021 proved to be at least as significant as the preceding years of open competition.
Trials to Break the Triangle
Following the peak of regional tensions, Turkish foreign policy shifted toward a comprehensive regional normalization initiative. Relations with Israel began a gradual, albeit cautious, normalization process; concrete efforts were made to restore mutual diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level, culminating in the historic visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara in 2022. During this exact same timeframe, Türkiye also initiated a broad diplomatic opening aimed at realigning its troubled relations with various other key regional actors.
Concurrently, a noticeable shift occurred in Türkiye-Greece relations. A new, more constructive diplomatic atmosphere aimed at actively reducing bilateral tensions—particularly as the year 2023 approached—took hold. Although fundamental, long-standing disputes concerning the Aegean airspace and maritime boundaries, the Cyprus partition, and maritime jurisdiction zones remained entirely unresolved, the political leadership in both Athens and Tel Aviv adopted a pragmatic approach demonstrating that ongoing competition could be successfully managed through dialogue.
This specific period remains particularly vital for understanding the underlying mechanics of Thucydides’ framework, primarily because the underlying structural conditions had not vanished. Türkiye continued to steadily expand its indigenous defense industry capacity and maintain a formidable regional military presence; Greece firmly maintained its core territorial and maritime positions in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean; and Israel refused to fundamentally alter its established regional security doctrine. Furthermore, Greece followed a parallel path of enhancement, continuously working to upgrade its own military capabilities and diplomatic standing.
Nevertheless, active diplomacy succeeded in significantly reducing the daily intensity of strategic competition.
Consequently, the 2021–2023 period revealed a crucial lesson for regional security analysts: structural shifts in material power do not exclusively determine final strategic outcomes on their own. How national power is perceived by rival capitals, and how adeptly political leaders manage these shifts through diplomacy, matters just as much as the raw distribution of military capabilities.
For this reason, rather than viewing the regional normalization of 2021–2023 as a simple, permanent period of diplomatic détente, it is far more accurate to interpret it as a concerted effort by all involved states to prevent shifting regional power balances from permanently deteriorating into lasting, unmanageable strategic conflict.
Unfortunately, this fragile diplomatic effort has steadily eroded under the immense pressure of the explosive new security environment that materialized globally and regionally after 2023.
From Competition to Militarization
The outbreak of the Gaza war and Israel’s extensive military campaigns in the Palestinian territories caused a severe, profound rupture in Türkiye-Israel relations, plunging diplomatic ties back into deep freeze. However, political analysts emphasize that attempting to explain the entire strategic transformation since 2023 solely through the narrow lens of the Gaza conflict remains fundamentally insufficient. A far more significant structural development has been the dangerous expansion of the geographical scope of competition and the growing interconnection of security issues that were once treated as separate.
Today, Syria’s fragile future political and security architecture holds direct, existential significance for Türkiye’s national security, broader regional influence, and forward military posture. Simultaneously, from Israel’s strategic perspective, the fluid new order emerging along its northern border in Syria has become directly linked to its immediate domestic border security, intelligence operations, and operational freedom of military movement across the Levant.
This evolving reality has given rise to a form of geopolitical competition that is qualitatively much harsher and more dangerous than the largely political and diplomatic tensions witnessed between Türkiye and Israel a decade ago. While past friction was largely confined to diplomatic posturing and verbal sparring, today’s competition is increasingly taking on an unyielding, hard geopolitical and military dimension.
At the exact same time, bilateral relations between Israel and Greece are acquiring an increasingly pronounced strategic and military character. Deepening defense cooperation, frequent joint military exercises, advanced defense technology sharing, and substantial arms procurement programs are bringing the national security perimeters of Athens and Tel Aviv much closer together.
The immense strategic significance that Athens attaches to this bilateral relationship is closely tied to the persistent balance of power between Greece and Türkiye. Conversely, Israel’s specific concerns regarding Türkiye stem from an entirely different set of geopolitical priorities. From the vantage point of Tel Aviv, ongoing crises in Syria, the Palestinian territories, the wider Eastern Mediterranean, and the overarching regional order occupy center stage.
This is precisely where the mechanics of the Thucydides Triangle become fully apparent. Israel does not necessarily have to view Türkiye through the exact same adversarial lens that Greece does. Nor is Greece strictly required to share Israel’s specific security anxieties regarding the evolving situation in Syria. What remains critically important, however, is that differing national perceptions of various regional threats are increasingly giving rise to strikingly similar strategic behaviors and alignments.
This dynamic is fostering a new security phenomenon that can aptly be defined as the "convergence of threats."
Distinct national security concerns are becoming tightly intertwined through formal defense cooperation, joint military technology ventures, aggressive regional armament programs, and overlapping alliances. The deepening defense ties between Israel and Greece directly influence Ankara’s internal security calculations and defense planning. In response, Türkiye’s persistent efforts to strengthen its national deterrence and indigenous military capabilities are, in turn, interpreted by Athens and Tel Aviv as growing threats, further intensifying their initial security concerns.
Thus, the classic Thucydidean mechanism begins its relentless cycle: concentrated power generates deep-seated fear; fear actively encourages competitive balancing; balancing prompts counterbalancing measures; and counterbalancing ultimately reinforces the entrenched belief that the initial fear was entirely justified.
This self-perpetuating cycle lies at the very beating heart of the Thucydides Triangle.
The Triangle Turning into a Trap
Crucially, all of these complex regional developments do not make outright military conflict inevitable. On the contrary, the recent historical experience of the 2021–2023 normalization phase clearly demonstrates that active political and diplomatic mechanisms can successfully manage dangerous tensions even when the underlying structural causes of competition remain firmly intact. The real, present danger in international politics arises only when regional actors begin to interpret every routine increase in each other’s national capabilities as undeniable evidence of hostile, aggressive intent.
The impressive growth of Türkiye’s regional capabilities does not, in and of itself, automatically constitute a direct military threat to either Israel or Greece. Similarly, Greece’s ongoing military modernization efforts do not inherently imply active preparations for armed conflict with Ankara. Nor do the robust security ties that Israel has systematically developed with Greece automatically constitute a unified anti-Turkish military axis.
However, in the volatile realm of international politics, subjective perceptions frequently matter just as much as objective material power. Therefore, for the leadership in Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Athens, the fundamental strategic challenge is not simply calculating who possesses a specific amount of military hardware. The core issue is whether regional diplomacy can successfully prevent the shifting balance of power from devolving into a self-perpetuating, vicious cycle of mutual fear and suspicion.
For Ankara, the most viable path forward lies in carefully combining credible national deterrence with open, pragmatic diplomacy. Türkiye cannot realistically ignore ongoing military developments unfolding directly in its immediate neighborhood, particularly as diverse security domains become increasingly interconnected. However, interpreting every instance of regional cooperation or diplomatic dialogue as part of a monolithic, coordinated strategy designed to encircle Türkiye risks exacerbating the security dilemma.
A remarkably similar strategic choice confronts Israeli policymakers. Viewing Türkiye’s expanding regional role and historical footprint entirely through the prism of an existential threat risks transforming manageable political disputes into a permanent, structural conflict. Türkiye remains a powerful, militarily influential, and geographically entrenched actor in the strategic environment surrounding Israel—a geopolitical reality that cannot simply be wished away or ignored.
From the perspective of Athens, pursuing external diplomatic and military partnerships is viewed as a necessary tool to strengthen national deterrence and diplomatic leverage. However, running the risk of turning every regional relationship into a rigid extension of the bilateral Türkiye-Greece balance could easily reproduce the very security dilemma that Athens is actively trying to navigate and contain.
Ultimately, the most profound lesson offered by Thucydides is not that the rise of new regional powers inevitably leads down the path to catastrophic war. The deeper, more enduring lesson is that shifting power dynamics inevitably generate psychological fear, and that unmanaged fear fundamentally distorts how sovereign states interpret one another’s daily behavior and long-term intentions.
This is precisely where the foundational challenge facing Türkiye, Israel, and Greece lies today. A sprawling new strategic triangle linking the vital waters of the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Levant is rapidly solidifying before the international community. Whether this volatile triangle ultimately evolves into a manageable arena of healthy competition that generates regional balance and stability, or instead metastasizes into a rigid structure that constantly churns out new sources of insecurity, depends just as much on pragmatic political choices as it does on the raw distribution of military power.
The Thucydides Triangle is actively taking shape across the region. However, its ultimate transformation into a destructive Thucydides Trap remains far from inevitable.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance, values, or official position of Daily Sabah. The newspaper provides space for diverse perspectives as part of its ongoing commitment to open, balanced, and informed public discussion.